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1. Introduction 
Sustainable development requires a long-term vision on the possibilities to reconcile 
economic, environmental and social needs. In this respect, world food production and 
consumption offer an enormous challenge. Presently sufficient food is produced on a 
global scale, but large differences exist in per capita consumption. One the one hand, 
poverty prevents many people in poor countries from attaining a sufficient diet, but on 
the other hand overweight and obesity belong to today’s most pervasive public health 
problems in rich countries. To meet the increasing global demand for food, two alterna-
tive routes can be taken: to expand and intensify agriculture, which already appropriates 
significant amounts of nature's resources or to change from resource-intensive meat con-
sumption to more vegetarian diets. The latter option is studied by the PROFETAS project, 
which focuses on the environmental sustainability, the technological feasibility and the 
social desirability to partially replace meat proteins with plant protein products, or so-
called novel protein foods. The Western consumption pattern is a suitable candidate for 
such a transition, which would benefit the environment as well as human health (Helms, 
2004).  
How can such a transition succeed? First of all, a novel protein food has to find its place 
on the market just like any other new product. The market is the place where sellers of a 
product meet potential buyers and where exchange between them can take place. Every 
market is subject to certain rules. Among other things, these rules aim to establish fair 
competition among sellers and to protect consumers against deceit, malpractice and risks 
to health and safety. The rules are set and enforced by the national government, but they 
are increasingly based upon international agreement in what we will call ‘the interna-
tional regulatory framework’. This international regulatory framework is quite complex, 
not in the least for (novel) food products.   
This report examines international rules and regulations affecting the marketing and sup-
port of novel protein foods, that may either provide opportunities or challenges to the 
transition towards a more vegetarian diet. In particular, it examines the rules for market 
entry, promotion and support. The most important rule-setting international institutions 
in this respect are the European Union (EU), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
This report sketches the structure of this international regulatory framework and exam-
ines how the rules of international institutions may affect the marketing of novel protein 
foods. The structure of the report is as follows. Section 2 introduces the main interna-
tional actors within the international regulatory framework for novel protein foods – the 
EU, the WTO and the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius. Section 3 examines the interna-
tionally agreed rules under which a novel food product may enter the EU market. Section 
4 examines the international rules that govern official support of a novel food product, 
with an emphasis on rules and regulations of the EU and the WTO. Section 5 examines 
the international regulatory framework for taxation of meat products as a way to indi-
rectly stimulate the production and consumption of proteins of vegetable origin. Section 
6, finally, concludes and makes some policy recommendations.  
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2. The international regulatory framework 
The international regulatory framework affecting the marketing of novel protein foods is 
quite complex. This chapter briefly introduces the main actors in the regulatory frame-
work. Section 2.1 deals with the European Union (EU). Section 2.2 briefly introduces the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and Section 2.3 briefly describes relevant aspects of 
the Codex Alimentarius of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO).  
2.1 The European Union 
Since May 1, 2004, the European Union (EU) comprises 25 European countries and has 
about 454 million inhabitants. It is governed through a complex structure made-up of 
five main institutions (European Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of Justice and 
Court of Auditors) and several supporting institutions (including, for example, the Euro-
pean Bank). Its legal basis is a series of Treaties, starting from the Treaties of Paris 
(1952) and Rome (1957), amended by the Single European Act (1986), the Treaties of 
Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001), which have been merged into 
one consolidated version called the Treaty of European Union.1        
The EU and its institutions have an important role in various aspects of the marketing of 
(novel) foods. Basic responsibilities of the EU in this area concern the free movement of 
goods across national borders of the internal market and the issue of food safety and con-
sumer protection. Based on certain provisions of the treaty establishing the European 
Community, the EU produced a series of directives and regulations concerning food 
safety and consumer protection. These directives and regulations entail rules on how and 
when novel foods should be approved (or not approved) to be marketed in Europe (‘au-
thorisation’), what kind of information should accompany these foods and in what form 
it should be presented to the consumer (‘labelling’), and how the novel foods should be 
tested for undesirable ingredients or substances (‘traceability’). EU internal market and 
competition policies determine, inter alia, the way that national governments can support 
domestic industries and firms with a view of fair competition For example, the rules pro-
hibits any business agreements "which have as their object or effect the prevention, re-
striction or distortion of competition within the common market" (Article 81, EC 
Treaty). They also prohibit "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion within the common market" (Article 82, EC Treaty). The European Commission 
plays an important role in monitoring aid given to companies by EU governments (‘State 
aid’) and can act if it doubts the compatibility of the aid with the EC Treaty. 
2.2 The World Trade Organization 
The WTO is an international organization that sets and administers rules for the trade of 
goods and services between nations. In its own words, its main goal is to ensure that this 
                                                   
1  The Treaty of European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community as in 
force from 1 February 2003 (Nice consolidated version).  
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trade is “as smooth, predictable and free as possible”.2 The WTO was established in 
1995 as the successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was 
established shortly after World War II. At present, the WTO has nearly 150 country 
members, while about 30 other countries are negotiating membership. The rules of the 
WTO are laid down in about 60 different agreements and separate commitments 
(‘schedules’) made by individual members in specific areas such as customs duty rights 
and market openings in services.3 Despite this sizeable body of rules and specific com-
mitments, the basic principles of the WTO are fairly simple. Regarding the international 
trade of goods, the basic principles are: 
1. The Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (Art. I, GATT). This principle states 
that each trading partner gets immediately and unconditionally the best treatment 
given to any other trading partner. Hence, there shall be no discrimination between 
like  
products or services originating in or destined for different countries; 
2. National Treatment (Art. III, GATT). Imported products shall be treated no less fa-
vourable than products of national origin in every respect. Hence, there shall be no 
discrimination between an imported product and a product of national origin, once 
that product has passed customs; 
3. Binding commitments (Art. II, GATT). A WTO member commits itself to ensure an 
agreed level of access to its market, on an MFN basis [that is, for all other WTO 
members], for supplying countries;  
4. Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions/Quota (Art. XI, GATT). In principle, WTO 
prohibits quantitative restriction on imports and exports and only allows duties, taxes 
or other charges. 
These basic principles apply to all goods trade, unless the trade falls within an explicit 
and well-defined exception. And of course, as one trade analyst once remarked: it is 
these exceptions, rather than the rules, that make the body of WTO legal texts so volu-
minous. One specific feature of WTO decision-making in WTO’s governing body (the 
Council) is that decisions are taken by consent. History has shown that this makes it very 
difficult for the WTO to change or adapt its rules in view of new developments. On oc-
casion, separate codes are adopted that give an authoritative interpretation to WTO’s ba-
sic rules in specific situations. Some of these specific Codes are of relevance to the in-
ternational trade in novel foods. However, in most cases it is up to WTO’s Dispute Set-
tlement Mechanism (WTO’s own judiciary) to interpret the rules in the light of new de-
                                                   
2  WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm 
3  Together these agreements and commitments cover about 30.000 pages of text. 
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velopments in specific cases.4 Hence, case law is extremely important in the interpreta-
tion of WTO’s rules.5   
2.3 Codex Alimentarius 
FAO and WHO are specialised agencies of the United Nations. FAO was established in 
1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition in the world, increase agricultural pro-
ductivity and better the lives of rural population. WHO was established in 1948 as a spe-
cialised UN agency with a mission to raise levels of human health. FAO and WHO 
jointly formed the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 1962 to set international stan-
dards for food quality and safety. Membership to the Commission that is responsible for 
the Codex is open to all members and associate members of the FAO and WHO and 
comprised of 163 countries in 1998.6 
This code is widely recognised and is considered “the single most important interna-
tional reference point for developments associated with food standards”.7 Chapter 7 of 
the Codex contains, inter alia, standards related to vegetable proteins.  
The standards of the Codex are not directly binding for members, but, as indicated 
above, they are an important reference point and they are often referred to by interna-
tional agreements that do have a legally binding nature, such as the WTO. Section 3.3 
below will briefly discuss these standards.  
 
                                                   
4  One such ‘new development’ that causes problems for the interpretation of WTO’s rules is 
the emergence of international environmental agreements that may consciously or uncon-
sciously affect trading opportunities of WTO members that may at the same time be mem-
bers of the international environmental agreement. The international community still has not 
found a satisfactory answer to the question of how to solve potential conflicts between WTO 
law and international environmental law.     
5  WTO’s critics often criticise the lack of transparency and democratic content of WTO’s deci-
sion making as this, to a large degree, evolves through case law.   
6  Website http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp 
7  Idem. 
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3. Regulation of market entry 
3.1 EU authorisation of novel foods 
Before a novel food can be placed on the EU market, it has to receive authorisation by 
the government. Since 1997, the procedure to get authorisation is specified in the Novel 
Food Regulation of the EU (Regulation (EC), No. 258/97). Novel foods and food ingre-
dients that were already on the EU market before 1997 (such as pea protein) are not af-
fected by this regulation, but new products must undergo a potentially lengthy and ex-
pensive authorisation procedure.  
The Novel Food Regulation defines a novel food or a novel food ingredient. These are 
foods or ingredients: 
• Which are produced from genetically modified organisms or which contain such or-
ganisms; 
• Which present a primary molecular structure; 
• Which consist of micro-organisms, fungi or algae; 
• Consist of or are isolated from plants or isolated from animals; 
• Whose nutritional value, metabolism or level of undesirable substances has been sig-
nificantly changed by the production process.  
In the authorisation procedure it is examined whether the novel food product presents a 
danger to the consumer, mislead him or her, or whether it is nutritionally disadvanta-
geous to him or her compared with the product it replaces. The EU has issued guidelines 
for the scientific aspects of this examination (97/618/EC). The examination is initially 
carried out by a national competent body, but the European Commission (assisted by its 
Standing Committee on Foodstuffs) may overrule the national authorisation. The final 
authorisation decision specifies the scope of the authorisation and specifies the condi-
tions of use, the designation of the food or food ingredient, its specification and the spe-
cific labelling requirements. Figure 3.1 presents a graphic overview of the most impor-
tant steps and decisions in the authorisation procedure.  
If the novel food is produced from or contains genetically modified organisms (GMO), it 
is subject to a special, additional procedure that emphasises the assessment of environ-
mental risk. Public concern in Europe over GMOs and GMO food led to a de facto mora-
torium on new applications since 1998. The EU has recently tried to end this moratorium 
by approving new and strict legislation concerning the traceability and labelling of GMO 
food and feed, but this legislation has not yet been implemented.8  
An important concept in the approval of novel foods is the concept of ‘substantial 
equivalence’. This concept was introduced by OECD (1993) as “the most practical ap-
proach to the determination of [food] safety.” The substantial equivalence test assesses 
whether a novel food is equivalent in all its substantive aspects to a conventional food 
                                                   
8  Regulation (EC) No. /2003 Concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified 
organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC. 
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product, if such exist. To establish substantial equivalence account should be taken of the 
processing that the food may undergo, as well as the intended use and the exposure, 
based the on the pattern of dietary consumption and the characteristics of the consuming 
population (OECD, 1993). The idea is that if a novel food is found to be ‘substantially 
equivalent’ to a well-known conventional food, it can be assumed to pose no new health 
risks and is hence acceptable for commercial use. 
Request to 
Member State
(Art. 4(1))
Member State 
initial assessment
(Art. 6(2))
No full evaluation 
required 
(Art. 6(3))
Report submitted 
to Commission 
(Art. 6(4))
Report circulated 
to other Member 
States 
(Art. 6(4))
No objection 
received within 
60 days – food 
may be marketed 
Reasoned objection 
– to be submitted 
within 60 days 
(Art. 6(4))
Proposal for full 
evaluation 
(Art. 6(3))
Additional 
assessment (Art. 7)
Authorisation
decision (Art. 7)
 
Figure 3.1  Authorisation procedure for novel foods (from Jukes(2004)) 
The concept of substantial equivalence has been sharply criticised, both for its defini-
tional vagueness and scientific validity (Millstone & Brunner, 1999), and for ethical rea-
sons (Pouteau, 2002). The ethical objections focus on the argument that a food product 
cannot be isolated from the socio-cultural and natural environment in which it is pro-
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duced and consumed. The notion of substantial equivalence would therefore unjustifia-
bly ‘reduce’ a food product to its material or substantial characteristics. 
For a novel protein food, however, it would be very positive as it was found to be sub-
stantially equivalent to a conventional food. In that case, its authorisation procedure 
would be relatively easy. In the contrasting case, when the novel food was not consid-
ered to be substantially equivalent to a conventional food, or when such a food simply 
did not exist before, the formal authorisation procedure would be much more demanding 
(both in time and resources). 
3.2 WTO and market entry  
The conditions of market entry are also of prime concern to the WTO and its members. 
WTO agreements of relevance to novel protein foods include: the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (establishing the basic principles of free trade), The Agree-
ments on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the Agreement on Agriculture.  
The WTO agreements specify the conditions of international market access. These con-
ditions relate to import tariffs and quota, but also to other rules and regulations that may 
unjustifiable discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers, the so-called non-
tariff barriers.  
The members of the WTO are divided over EU policies on GMOs. The United States 
(US) have, together with Canada and Argentina, officially challenged EUs policies be-
fore the WTO.9 The US claim that EU’s stance with respect to GMOs is an unjustified 
technical (non-tariff) barrier to the access of US products on the EU market. The issue of 
GMOs looms large in the present so-called ‘Doha Development Round’ of trade negotia-
tions within the WTO.  
The roots of the dispute between the EU and other WTO members (especially the US) 
are commonly ascribed to a different approach to the assessment of risk for human 
health and the environment. While the US would have a tendency to put the burden of 
proof on the prosecutor (i.e., the product is allowed except in the case of scientific proof 
of risk), the EU would have the tendency to put the burden of proof on the defendant 
(i.e., the product is forbidden except if it can be proved that there is no risk). Examples 
of this approach to risk assessment of the EU are the GMO and the hormones-in-beef 
import prohibitions. It has also been argued, however, that the main difference between 
the EU and the US in this respect is not so much a question of principle, but basically de-
rives from differing social-cultural tolerances for certain risks. While the EU would be 
less tolerant to risks related to GMOs and hormones, the US would be more sensitive to 
risks related to, for example, new drugs, blood donations, and mad cow disease. 
(Daemen, 2003). The WTO rules favour the approach to risk assessment of putting the 
burden of proof on the prosecutor (‘allow except’). The alternative EU approach to risk 
assessment (‘forbid except’) might be a barrier to the introduction of novel protein foods. 
                                                   
9  Press release of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (August 7, 2003). 
“United States requests dispute panel in WTO challenge to EU biotech moratorium”. 
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3.3 International standards for novel foods: the codex alimentarius  
The Codex Alimentarius contains international standards for vegetable protein products 
(VPP).10 The Codex defines vegetable protein products as “food products produced by 
the reduction or removal from vegetable materials of certain of the major non-protein 
constituents (water, oil, starch, other carbohydrates) in a manner to achieve a protein (N 
x 6.25) content of 40% or more. The protein content is calculated on a dry weight basis 
excluding added vitamins, minerals.” 11 The standards contain prescriptions for allowed 
food additives, contaminants, hygiene, packaging and labelling. The guidelines for the 
utilization of vegetable protein products in foods, contains specific reference to the use 
of vegetable protein products in partial or complete substitution of animal protein in 
foods. The guidelines stipulate that this substitution should be permitted on the condi-
tions that 1) the presence of the vegetable protein product is clearly indicated on the label 
of the food product, and 2) sufficient consideration is given to the nutritional adequacy 
of the partially or completely substituted food, defined in terms of protein quality and 
quantity and content of minerals and vitamins.12 The guidelines also contain specific 
guidelines for testing safety and nutritional quality of vegetable protein products. 
                                                   
10  Codex standard for wheat protein products including wheat gluten, Codex Stan 163-1987, 
Rev. 1-2001; Codex general standard for vegetable protein products (VPP), Codex Stan 174-
1989; Codex general guidelines for the utilization of vegetable protein products (VPP) in 
foods, CAC/GL 4-1989; Guidelines for the use of non-meat protein products in processed 
meat and poultry products, CAC/GL 15-1991. 
11  Codex general standard for vegetable protein products (VPP), Codex Stan 174-1989. 
12  Codex general guidelines for the utilization of vegetable protein products (VPP) in foods, 
CAC/GL 4-1989. The guidelines elaborate on methods to safeguard nutritional adequacy.   
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4. Regulation of promotion and support 
If a novel protein food is granted access to the (EU) market, the firm that has developed 
the food may wish to establish exclusive rights over the sales of the products, and the na-
tional or EU government may wish to stimulate the sales of the product, for example be-
cause of its environmental superiority over the food it competes with. This chapter 
briefly examines the international regulatory framework that deals with property rights 
and government support. Section 4.1 briefly examines the international regime on ‘intel-
lectual property rights’. Section 4.2 examines international rules on government support, 
both by the European Union (4.2.1) and the WTO (4.2.2). Section 4.3 pays attention to 
eco-labelling of novel protein products. 
4.1 Intellectual property rights 
Inventors of novel protein foods might want to establish exclusive rights over their prod-
uct in order to restrict competition and to earn ‘monopoly’ rents over the sales of the 
product, at least for some time. While governments do usually not favour restriction of 
competition, an exception for innovators may be made on the grounds that innovation 
provides external benefits to society that cannot be appropriated by innovators in a fully 
competitive market. Hence, the exclusive rights over the sale of the product help to ‘in-
ternalise’ the external benefits of innovation and thereby give an incentive to innovation. 
Without such an incentive, there would be ‘too little’ innovation from a social point of 
view.  
The exclusive rights over the sale of the product may be established by ‘intellectual 
property rights’,13 if certain conditions are met. For example, for a patent to be granted 
the product or process should be “new, involve and inventive step and [be] capable of 
industrial application.” 14 The exclusive rights offer the developer of the new product 
monopoly rents for a specific length of time (often about twenty years). The size (and 
even the existence) of the monopoly rents will, of course, depend on the success of the 
product in the market.  
The World International Property Organization (WIPO) administers most multilateral 
treaties on Intellectual Property Rights.15 The TRIPS Agreement of the WTO contains 
rules for intellectual property rights’ regimes to which WTO members have committed 
themselves. Critics of this Agreement have argued that the TRIPS rules are overly re-
stricting and too broad in scope, conflicting with more traditional rights of people and 
communities in developing countries, and giving governments too little scope to refuse 
patenting on the grounds of considerations of public interest. An example is the recent 
international controversy over cheap AIDS medicines for developing countries. It has 
                                                   
13  ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ include specific rights such as patents, copyright, trademarks, 
trade secrets, plant breeders’ rights, etc. (Dutfield, 2000).  
14  TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27 (Patentable Subject Matter). 
15  Including the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, and the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Dutfield, 2000).  
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also been argued that the length of period in which protection is granted by intellectual 
property rights is often too long.  
If a novel protein food can be patented in one market (if it is sufficiently new, innovative 
and capable of industrial application), the TRIPS agreement offers its developers more 
certainty over the protection of their ‘invention’ in overseas markets. The TRIPS agree-
ment could therefore stimulate the invention and development of novel protein foods by 
offering international protection of the intellectual property rights of its inventors. 
4.2 Subsidies and other government support 
Forms of government support include direct subsidies and fiscal measures, such as a re-
duction of value-added taxes or other taxes on the product. These forms of government 
support are subject to international rules, both at the level of the EU as at the level of the 
WTO. 
4.2.1 EU rules on ‘state aid’ 
The EU has developed rules with respect to government aid (‘State aid’) to firms and in-
dustries. We will briefly review these rules to examine whether and under what condi-
tions government EU competition law would allow support for the promotion of novel 
protein foods.  
In principle, EU law prohibits selective government support (‘State aid’) to firms and in-
dustries if this support could lead to a distortion of competition or if it might affect inter-
national trade between Member States (Art. 87(1) EC Treaty). Such aid is only allowed 
in a limited number of exceptions (Art. 87(3) EC Treaty). If one wants to examine the 
legitimacy of a subsidy for novel protein products, on should therefore examine if the 
subsidy would qualify as (prohibited) state aid and if so, whether it could be ‘saved’ by 
one of the exceptions to the prohibition of such aid. Recent jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court seems to suggest that a legal test for the determination of (prohibited) state 
aid consists of five elements, namely whether there is (Bacon, 2003):  
1. An aid in the sense of a benefit or advantage; 
2. Which is granted by the state or through state resources; 
3. Which favours certain undertakings over others (the ‘selectivity’ principle); 
4. Which distorts or threatens to distort competition; and 
5. Which is capable of affecting trade between Member States.  
A few elements of this five-prong test deserve further attention. First, aid can be in the 
form of a direct subsidy or a fiscal advantage, but the provision also covers more indirect 
forms of aid. Second, the aid must be selective in that it favours certain undertakings 
over others. In the case of aid for environmental purposes (or to promote sustainable de-
velopment) it is hard to imagine a form of support that would not be selective. However, 
not all aid for environmental purposes is forbidden, see below). Third, the criteria of dis-
tortions and trade effects are in fact quite weak: no actual distortions of competition or 
trade effects have to be shown: it is enough that the aid is ‘threatens’ to distort or is ‘ca-
pable’ of trade effects. The burden of proof seems to be on the other side: the advocate 
of state aid must present proof that the aid does not ‘threaten’ competition or is not ‘ca-
pable’ of causing trade effects. Any effective aid for environmental purposes or for sus-
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tainable development will almost necessarily have this distortion effect: it usually wants 
to put cleaner of more sustainable firms in a better (or less worse) competitive position 
relative to their dirtier or less sustainable competitors. State aid to promote novel protein 
food will almost inevitably favour some firms (the novel protein food producers) over 
others (e.g., the meat producers) and improve the competitive position of novel protein 
food producers (and hence ‘distort’ competition in the language of EU competition law).     
While state aid to novel protein food producers would thus almost certainly classify as 
state aid in the meaning of Art. 87(1), it remains to be seen whether this type of state aid 
can be ‘saved’ by the exceptions to its general prohibition. The exceptions are listed in 
Art. 87(2) and (3) of the EC Treaty and are further elaborated in separate guidelines. The 
exceptions in Art 87(2) are limited to aid with a social character and with little or no ef-
fect on competition. Exceptions in Art 87(3) have a more general character; they refer to 
aid to promote the economic development of certain underprivileged areas, aid to rem-
edy ‘serious disturbances’, to facilitate the development of certain economic activities, to 
promote culture and heritage conservation, and other categories of aid as may be speci-
fied by a decision of the Council. Perhaps the most relevant exception ground for state 
aid to novel protein foods is the exception 3b where it is stated that aid “to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest…”may be considered to 
be compatible with the common market.16 Environmental protection is considered to be 
one important project of common European interest. This exception can therefore pro-
vide a legal basis for state aid for environmental protection. As of 1974, the European 
Commissions has drafted a series of guidelines to specify the conditions under which 
state aid might be provided for environmental protection. The current guidelines are 
from the year 2001 (EC, 2001).  
In the guidelines on state aid for environmental protection, the Commission makes it 
clear that state aid for environmental protection should be the exception rather than the 
rule. Its guiding principle in financing environmental protection measures is the polluter 
pays principle. Hence, the costs of measures to deal with pollution should be borne by 
the polluter who causes the pollution (EC, 2001: para 6). In principle, therefore, “aid is 
not justified in the case of investments designed merely to bring companies into line with 
new or existing Community technical standards”. (EC, 2001: para 20). The polluter pays 
principle seeks to ‘internalise’ environmental costs into the costs of production. This en-
sures that polluting inputs will be relatively more expensive than clean inputs, and also 
that ‘dirty’ products will be relatively more expensive than ‘clean’ products. Hence, 
profit maximising firms and utility maximising consumers can make their own choices 
with respect to inputs, production methods and consumer products, respectively, on the 
basis of ‘true’ prices, i.e. prices that take account of environmental costs. Any state sub-
sidy for environmental protection would ‘distort’ prices, in the sense that subsidised en-
vironmental costs would not show up in the market price of the final product. Hence, 
state aid would ‘distort’ the price signal to consumers who would therefore lack the in-
centive to buy a ‘cleaner’ consumption bundle. 
In the case of novel protein food, the polluter pays principle requires that all environ-
mental costs of food production and consumption would be borne by the polluter and 
                                                   
16  Emphasis added. 
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that prices of food products would reflect these environmental costs. If production and 
consumption of novel protein foods would generate less environmental costs than the 
production and consumption of conventional meat products, then there would be a rela-
tive cost advantage to novel protein foods. According the polluter pays principle it is not 
necessary – and even economically damaging – to support novel protein food beyond the 
level of support that is granted through the internalisation of environmental costs. 
The guidelines, however, make some exceptions for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) who may be eligible for temporary aid to adapt to new standards (EC, 2001: 
para 18a) and also allow to some extent state aid as an incentive for firms to improve on 
standards (EC, 2001: para 18b). Whether and under what circumstances and conditions 
state aid for novel protein food would be allowed is difficult to predict with certainty. 
However, it is clear that in EU law, state aid is not the preferred instrument to promote 
the market penetration of novel protein food. Even if it would be allowed in certain cir-
cumstances it would certainly be subject to severe restrictions and strict conditions.   
4.2.2 WTO rules on subsidies 
Subsidies to firms may distort international trade by giving the subsidised firm a cost ad-
vantage over its foreign competitors. As such, this could amount to a different treatment 
of imported products in comparison to products of national origin, contradictory to the 
principle of National Treatment (see Section 2.2). Therefore, WTO prohibits subsidies 
that are either designed to discriminate between domestic and foreign producers (prohib-
ited subsidies), or can be shown to have an adverse effect on a foreign country’s com-
mercial interests (actionable subsidies). Basic provisions on subsidies are laid down in 
Art. XVI, GATT. These basic provisions are elaborated in WTO’s Agreement on Subsi-
dies. With respect to environmental subsidies, there are thee main differences in com-
parison to EU’s rules on state aid: 
1. Unlike the EU (and the OECD), the WTO does not recognise the polluter pays prin-
ciple as a leading principle for environmental policy. In fact, the WTO is not con-
cerned with the quality or efficiency of its members’ domestic policies. The WTO is 
only concerned about the effects of subsidies on international trade;  
2. Unlike EU’s rules on state aid that prohibit subsidies that threaten to distort competi-
tion or are capable of affecting trade, WTO can only prohibit subsidies if their ad-
verse effects on competition and trade can in fact be demonstrated.17;  
3. While EU’s rules on state aid only apply to EU’s internal market, WTO rules on sub-
sidies apply to nearly 150 WTO members. 
A study on the international trade aspects of the introduction of novel protein foods that 
was carried out for the Profetas project showed that a Dutch consumer subsidy for novel 
                                                   
17  Subsidies are objectionable if they cause injury to the domestic industry of another country, if 
they entail nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to another country under the 
GATT, or if they cause serious prejudice to the interest of another country (Howse & Trebil-
cock, 1996).  
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protein foods might have the effect of an export subsidy (Herok, 2003).18 If this would be 
the case, foreign governments could file a complaint against such an ‘actionable’ subsidy 
with the WTO. 
The government could stimulate the consumption of novel protein foods in a more indi-
rect way, for example by sponsoring research or by advocating them in diet-related 
health promotion campaigns, and so on. A link could also be made to the World Health 
Organization’s Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health that, inter alia, 
warns against the dangers to health of the excessive consumption of fatty foods.19 
4.3 Eco-labelling 
Sellers of novel protein foods may also wish to signal to the consumer certain beneficial 
properties of these foods by means of (eco-) labelling schemes established by themselves 
or by independent third parties. Rules for such schemes are under discussion at the 
WTO, especially in the Committee of Trade and Environment (CTE) and the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. The discussion seems to focus predominantly on the 
trade aspects of voluntary eco-labelling schemes (including schemes implemented and 
administered by non-state actors) (see, for example, WTO, 2000). At the WTO level, the 
question is what role could/should the TBT committee play, in coordination with the 
CTE, to promote reducing barriers to trade through the application of the TBT. For in-
stance, should it seek to determine which eco-labelling systems are accepted by the mul-
tilateral trading system? Should it define which eco-labelling requirements/criteria are 
considered to be consistent with the TBT agreement?  
There is in general no problem if the eco-label refers to some property of the product it-
self, such as its plant-based origin. In fact, as was discussed above, the Codex Alimen-
tarius international standards on novel foods demand such labelling information. More 
controversial are labelling schemes that relate to environmental and/or social conditions 
under which the product is produced (non-product related production and processing 
methods, or PPMs).  
At present a wealth of voluntary eco-labelling schemes is operating in most Western 
markets. They are not (yet) challenged on the grounds that they violate WTO obliga-
tions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) carried out exten-
sive research programmes on the trade effects of eco-labelling and other environment-
related technical barriers to trade, employing a case study methodology (OECD, 1997). 
Based on case study research, OECD (Vitalis, 2002) argues that many private eco-
labelling schemes are trade distorting, discriminatory, and environmentally disappoint-
                                                   
18  Herok (2003) suggests that a 20% consumer subsidy on novel protein foods in the Nether-
lands could have a modest effect on domestic consumption of these foods (+ 1.6 %), but 
could affect foreign production of novel protein foods dramatically (between – 20 % to – 50 
% in EU countries, and – 9 % to – 18 % in the rest of the world: see Table 27). It should be 
noted, however, that these estimates are tentitative and should be confirmed by further re-
search.   
19  Website http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/. 
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ing. The paper argues for more public participation of private eco-labelling schemes to 
encourage transparency and non-discrimination.  
Concluding then, the debate on eco-labelling within the WTO is in full swing, but has 
not yet resulted in firm decisions. We do not expect that the WTO will seriously chal-
lenge voluntary eco-labelling as such, but it might be that international standards will be 
developed for voluntary eco-labelling schemes to increase transparency and non-
discrimination. Obviously, developers of eco-labelling schemes for novel protein foods 
should take account of the on-going debate in this area and, if possible, follow guidelines 
for transparency and non-discrimination that are already issued by international institu-
tions such as the OECD.  
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5. Regulation of taxation 
A number of Dutch organisations have recently proposed a consumer charge on meat 
and meat products, for various reasons. The reasons included: to generate revenues for 
the destruction of cattle due to the BSE crisis (Tweede Kamer, 2002), to generate reve-
nues to stimulate animal welfare (Hees, Verschuur, & Wit, 2003), or to reduce the price 
gap between organic and conventional meat and meat products (Remmers, 2003). In 
practice, the consumer charge on meat and meat products could be implemented by an 
increase of the VAT rate from the present reduced rate on foodstuffs (6 %) to the general 
rate (19 %)), a specific consumer charge such as an excise tax, or a charge levied by the 
relevant commodity board.  
A consumer charge on meat and meat products might also be considered as a way to 
stimulate the consumption of novel protein foods, either directly, by using the revenues 
of the charge to subsidise the production or consumption of novel protein foods, or indi-
rectly, by its impact on the relative prices of meat and protein foods.   
The Dutch Government is not in favour of a charge on meat and meat products. Its ar-
guments against such a charge are partly practical, partly economic and partly related to 
the international legal framework (Tweede Kamer, 2003). With respect to the interna-
tional legal framework, the following observations can be made: 
• The EU rules on state aid do not allow to ‘earmark’ the revenues of a consumer 
charge for a specific purpose (e.g., the destruction of BSE cattle). Such a use of reve-
nue would also be in conflict with the non-discrimination principle in international 
trade, because the supply of both domestic and foreign producers would be charged, 
but only domestic producers would benefit from the revenue of the charge20; 
• ‘Meat’ is not a well-specified product category. Meat comes in various forms and 
shapes and in various stages of processing into food products (such as pizzas). This 
poses problems for the VAT as well as for the excise tax alternative. Especially for 
the excise tax alternative, the assessment of the meat content of an imported product 
may cause serious difficulties and may lead to an uneven treatment of domestic and 
foreign suppliers. For the VAT alternative, the problem is that a product can only be 
in the 6% or the 19% tariff rate (there is no middle way). If processed food would be 
included in the scheme, the increase from 6% to 19% VAT would be applicable to all 
food products with meat in them, however small the fraction of meat.  
It is important to note that international regulations do, in general, not prohibit taxes per 
se, but they do regulate the design of the tax. In general, the revenues of a consumer 
charge on meat and meat products should accrue to the general budget, and should not be 
used to finance certain measures in specific industries. In addition, the consumer charge 
should not discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers.  
                                                   
20  The European Commission refused a French scheme where the revenues of a consumer 
charge on meat and meat products were used to finance the collection and destruction of car-
casses and offal, on these grounds (Tweede Kamer, 2003).    
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An example may illustrate the kind of problems that arise because of the non-
discrimination principle. Take the example that organic meat would be exempted from 
the consumer charge. The non-discrimination principle demands that organic meat from 
foreign suppliers should also be exempted from the charge. However, how can the na-
tional authority check whether all foreign meat that is supplied under the label ‘organic’ 
is really organic? Specific measures should be taken to be able to certify the authenticity 
of the ‘organic’ claim, and the non-discrimination principle would also require that the 
process of certification should be transparent and not be disproportionally difficult or 
expensive for foreign producers in comparison to their domestic competitors. All this 
could be difficult – and is often difficult – to implement in practice.21 
                                                   
21  A practical solution could be to reserve the exception under the tariff to meat and meat prod-
ucts that are certified by some internationally recognised scheme such as IFOAM (Interna-
tional Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements). The question is whether this solution 
would hold against challenges before the WTO of importers of non-certified organic meat (or 
meat that has been certified by some competing organisation).   
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
International institutions provide incentives and barriers for the introduction, marketing 
and promotion of novel foods and food ingredients, but on balance the barriers seem to 
exceed the incentives.  
Market introduction and market support of novel protein foods are subject to certain 
rules. These rules are increasingly set at international levels: both at the EU and at global 
level. Since 1997, the Novel Food Regulation of the EU sets the rules for the authorisa-
tion procedure. This procedure can be a barrier for the introduction of novel foods or 
food ingredients, especially if these foods or food ingredients are produced from GMOs. 
If the latter is the case, the procedure for authorisation is very strict.  
Once the novel food is granted market access, it is important for commercial developers 
of novel protein foods to have the exclusive rights over the sale of these foods and to be 
protected against imitation by competitors. ‘Intellectual property rights’ regimes grant 
such rights and are increasingly based on multilateral cooperation and enforcement, 
through WIPO, the WTO and other organisations.  
Promotion of novel protein goods by means of eco-labelling is controversial at the inter-
national level (WTO), if the eco-label criteria relate to the conditions under which the 
good is produced. Direct government support to the marketing of novel protein foods is 
also the subject of international, EU and WTO, law. It is not clear whether consumer 
subsidies for novel protein foods would be allowed under the state aid provisions of the 
EU. If the consumer subsidy would have the effect of an export subsidy and would im-
pose damage on the foreign production of novel protein foods, such a subsidy could be 
challenged before the WTO. An indirect way to stimulate the production and consump-
tion of novel protein foods could perhaps be a tax on meat and meat products. A con-
sumption charge would not be prohibited by international law per se, but international 
laws would certainly have an impact on the design of the charge and the use of its reve-
nue. Government agencies can, of course, encourage the consumption of novel protein 
foods by information campaigns and other non-discriminatory means.   
The barriers erected by international institutions are mainly meant to protect the con-
sumer and to resist protectionist’ practices in international trade. These barriers cannot 
be circumvented, whatever the potential qualities of the new product. For a successful in-
troduction and marketing of novel foods and ingredients, these barriers should be taken 
into account. Therefore, it is easier to start with foods and ingredients that are already 
authorised than to start with foods and ingredients that are still to be authorised, espe-
cially if they are derived of, or contain, GMOs. For the promotion of the novel foods and 
ingredients, not too much should be expected of traditional government instruments such 
as taxes and subsidies. Subsidies have already lost their appeal in most EU countries for 
purely domestic reasons, and additionally they are heavily restricted by EU regulations 
concerning state aid the single market. General government support by means of the 
sponsoring of research and by food education is not likely to be challenged before inter-
national institutions, however. 
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If novel foods and ingredients are to become a success, it should primarily be through 
private, commercial means and action. International institutions can protect and support 
commercial interests, for example, through the international protection of intellectual 
property rights. 
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